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Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign
and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model*
Gerhard Caspert

But in the exercise of such a prerogative, as declaring war, dispatch, secrecy,
and vigor are often indispensable, and always useful towards success. On the
other hand, it may be urged in reply, that the power of declaring war is not
only the highest sovereign prerogative; but that it is in its own nature and
effects so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliberation,
and the successive review of all the councils of the nation. War, in its best
estate, never fails to impose upon the people the most burthensome taxes and
personal sufferings. . . . It is sometimes fatal to public liberty itself, by
introducing a spirit of military glory, which is ready to follow, wherever a
successful commander will lead; and in a republic, whose institutions are
essentially founded on the basis of peace, there is infinite danger, that war
will find it both imbecile in defence, and eager for contest. . . . The cooperation of all the branches of the legislative power ought, upon principle,
to be required in this the highest act of legislation, as it is in all others.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES, Vol.

m, 60-61 (1833)

Although Congress attempts much, it accomplishes comparatively little.
JAMES BRYCE, in KARL BAEDEKER,
THE UNITED STATES, HANDBOOK FOR

TRAVELLERS 11 (4th ed. Leipzig, 1909).

The manner in which recent Presidents have conducted
United States foreign and defense policy suggests an absence in
practice of constitutional constraints and the presence of surprisingly few political constraints.' The Vietnam tide of unrestrained
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executive policy making reached its high-water mark in 1967 when
President Johnson said of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution: "We stated
then, and we repeat now, we did not think the resolution was necessary to do what we did and what we're doing." 2 In light of the
constitutional plan of coordination between the legislative and executive branches in the conduct of foreign and defense policy, such
claims of unrestrained executive power pose some puzzling questions about constitutional law in particular, and perhaps about our
theory of law in general.
This paper examines the trend toward unilateral executive
policy making in the areas of defense and foreign affairs from the
vantage point of legal theory. The first part finds that the trend was
facilitated by the prevailing "judicial" model of constitutional constraints. In the second part of the paper, an alternative constraint
model, not dependent on judicial intervention, will be explored in
light of the concepts of separation of powers and checks and balances.

I
To ask what constitutional constraints limit the conduct of
foreign and defense policy is to assume that such constraints exist.
This assumption seems reasonable enough on one level of analysis:
the Constitution neither confers unlimited authority over foreign
and defense policy on the President, nor exempts him from
accountability. One of the most firmly established principles of
American political theory is that the Constitution, in Marshall's
phrase, is "fundamental and paramount law." 3 The Supreme Court
has, if not consistently, then occasionally, gone out of its way to
* A preliminary draft of this paper was prepared in response to an invitation by the
Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. and presented to a discussion group chaired by Senator
Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., held in Washington, D.C. on April 8, 1975. The views expressed
are, of course, those of the author. I am grateful to Stanley Katz and Philip Kurland, who
read an early draft.
t Professor of Law and Political Science, The University of Chicago.
I An analysis of these developments from the vantage point of Congress is provided by
SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL COMMITMENTS, S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967).
2 Quoted in G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 442 (9th ed.
1975).
3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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stress that not even "the great exigencies of government" suspend
the Constitution. Perhaps the best-known formulation of this principle in Supreme Court decisions is the statement made by Justice
Davis at the end of the Civil War: "The Constitution of the t-nited
States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace
"4

As soon as this high level of normative abstraction is abandoned, however, one seems to be standing in quicksand. Assumptions about the existence of constitutional constraints quickly become questionable when the actual conduct of foreign and defensb
policy is examined. An empirical concept of constitutional law,
rooted in legal realism, rather than the prescriptive one, has been
generally accepted when it comes to the Constitution and foreign
affairs.
If a philanthropist were to establish a prize for the unpretentious facile phrase, he would do well to name it in honor of
Justice Holmes: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 5
While the exact mischief caused by this definition is difficult to
ascertain, it, as well as Langdell's invention of the "case method"
as the primary mode of legal education, has clearly contributed to
a neglect of the basic institutional arrangements of government.'
Thus, in teaching and research, reference has been primarily to the
constitutional law embodied in Supreme Court decisions.7 A remark
made by Charles Evans Hughes, when Governor of New York, has
become the most famous shorthand expression of this attitude:
"The Constitution is what the judges say it is.'8
More importantly, however, Holmes and the legal realists, with
their disdain for mere "paper rules" and their desire for the "scienEx parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).
O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in CoLLEcrE LEGAL PAPERS 173 (1920). On the

prediction theory of law, see G.

CASPER, JURISTISCHER REAmSMUS UND POLITiSCHE THEORIE IM

(1967).
6 See Casper, Two Models of Legal Education, 41 TENN. L. REv. 13, 17-18 (1973).
7 A look at any constitutional law casebook will prove this proposition. However, one of
the more interesting by-products of the constitutional developments concerning Vietnam and
Watergate has been the inclusion in such "casebooks" of significant amounts of non-case
materials, a somewhat belated adoption of a more general trend among authors of casebooks
in other areas. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, supra note 2. The trend is even clearer in P. BREST,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (1975).
' THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EvANs HUGHES 143 (R. Danelski & J. Tulchin
ed. 1973). Hughes complained that his words were taken out of context, that he had not
intended to be flippant, but rather had been speaking of the essential function of the courts
in the American system. Either way, he confirms the American preoccupation with the courts.
AMERIKANISCHEN RECHTSDENKEN 56-64
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tific" verification of law, gave new currency to a Hamiltonian
theme. Writing in the tradition of Hobbes, Hamilton had stressed
that resolutions or commands that pretend to be laws amount to
nothing more "in fact" than advice, "if there be no penalty annexed
to disobedience." 9 The realist likewise insisted that law had to have
"consequences" before it could be viewed as "real" law. While this
is not the place to evaluate the "bad man's theory of law,"' 0 its
continued popularity is important to an understanding of the prevailing view of constitutional constraints as it arose in the context
of precedent-oriented American legal culture.
The lack of effective sanctions to enforce constitutional constraints on the conduct of foreign and defense policy has caused
many of the constitutional rules prescribing governmental organization for the conduct of such policies to be viewed more as "recommendations" than as actual legal constraints. Critics of executive or
congressional action in the field of foreign affairs who have the audacity to argue straight from the constitutional text are likely to be
belittled as "fundamentalists."" The tendency to view constitutional rules as no more than recommendations has been further
encouraged by the relative scarcity of case law, particularly Supreme Court decisions, defining constitutional constraints on the
conduct of foreign and defense policy. The common law tradition
has led to a virtual identification of legal reasoning with incremental
advances of doctrine from case to case. The organizational principles of the Constitution, if unassisted by case law, do not quite fit
the rest of the law. Their ambiguity (real or alleged) leads to a
perception of this part of constitutional law as even "softer" than
those areas in which the courts are active. Moreover, litigation normally leads to an accumulation of precedents and consequently to
a reduction of legal uncertainty. Where there is little litigation,
uncertainty tends to be high; in the area of foreign affairs, such
uncertainty appears to favor the actor who, under difficult and
12
trying circumstances, takes the initiative.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 95 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
, On Holmes, see Rogat, The Judge as Spectator,31 U. Cm. L. REV. 213 (1964).
McDougal and Lans used the colorful pejorative "mechanical, filiopietistic theory."
McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or PresidentialAgreements: Interchangeable Instruments of NationalPolicy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 212 (1945). For a recent expression of the same point of view, see Rostow, Response, in Symposium-Organizingthe Government to Conduct Foreign Policy: The Constitutional Questions, 61 VA. L. Rav. 747, 798
(1975).
12 An important illustration of this proposition is the House Judiciary Committee's refusal to include among the articles of impeachment an item accusing President Nixon of
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The scarcity of case law on foreign and defense matters seems
to be the key to the perception of constitutional constraints in this
area as amorphous, uncertain, and hence, for the most part, advisory rather than prescriptive. It has had other effects as well. For
example, the manner in which judicial decision making has been
avoided (particularly through the "political question" doctrine) has
created a demarcation between law and politics which, in turn, has
diminished the effectiveness of existing nonjudicial sanctions. Another, perhaps inevitable corollary of the scarcity of decisions has
been an exaggerated emphasis on the few that do exist and an
irresistible opportunity for the creation of constitutional and political mythologies. Before turning to a closer examination of these
effects, however, I shall explore in detail some of the factors that
have produced the lack of case law.
The relative lack of judicial decisions on foreign and defense
matters is not only a function of the case-or-controversy requirement in its various manifestations, but also of the doctrines of justiciability and the nature of foreign and defense policy. Principles of
standing, ripeness, mootness, and the prohibition on advisory opinions, at least in the past, often stood in the way of adjudication.
Since many of the questions about separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances arise out of conflicts between the
executive and the legislature (or members thereof), they often remain unlitigated because the parties involved are either unable or
unwilling to submit their dispute to judicial resolution.
To be sure, recent developments in the law of standing 3 have
produced some changes that, in the future, may lower the standing
barriers to legislator suits. While some lower federal courts continue
to refuse standing to legislators" because they do not fit the "private
rights" model of adjudication, 5 other federal courts have drawn
liberal conclusions from the Supreme Court's liberalization of
standing criteria."6 Yet the final outcome of such efforts is uncertain,

illegally bombing Cambodia.

HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD

H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1974).
13See Monaghan, ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and When, 82 YAL L.J. 1363,
1379-83 (1973); Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A FunctionalAnalysis, 86 HARv. L.
REv. 645, 660-69 (1973); Note, Standing to Sue for Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665,
1666-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as YALE NOTE].
"1 See, e.g., Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
11Monaghan, supra note 13, at 1365; Scott, supra note 13, at 648.
" See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488
NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
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not only because the courts are in conflict, but also because the
rationale sometimes advanced for granting standing to legislators
(that is, adjudication of the dispute would have an impact on the
plaintiffs' duties to consider impeachment, make appropriations,
and take other legislative action) 17 seems to be in stark conflict with
the rule against advisory opinions. Even if it were wise to shift the
inquiry normally associated with standing toward other questions
concerning justiciability,"5 I find it difficult to believe that many
legislator suits would ever be decided on the merits. 9
Even if the courts were open to legislator suits, however, the
parties involved in conflicts over foreign and defense policies would
often be unwilling to litigate them. Put differently: the relative
scarcity of case law on foreign and defense matters is a function also
of the particular kind of politics involved. A President who acts on
his own initiative frequently can get away with actions of dubious
legality. As Stanley Hoffman, describing the unilateral act as a
"gambler's move," said: "If things go well no questions will be
asked, even if it leaves a lingering resentment. If things go sour,
knives will be sharpened ....
,,20 The knives that are sharpened,
however, will rarely be legal knives. The actual or imagined international consequences of attempting to undo a presidential fait
accompli will always temper Congress's willingness to take a
President to task in order to vindicate its views on the proper role
of the Congress in shaping foreign policy. In short, while legal and
constitutional arguments will always be relevant, it is in the nature
of things that their significance will be limited. Furthermore, until
recently, antagonism between the Congress and the President over
foreign policy was generally understood to be "political" in nature
-leading to the employment of political means of "getting back"
at a President who had aroused congressional displeasure. 2 '
F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973); YALE NOTE, supra
note 13, at 1666.
" Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
This is the approach advocated by the YALE NoTE, supra note 13, at 1685.
Apart from all other considerations, the prohibition against advisory opinions should
be taken most seriously. Its function is not merely to implement the article III case-orcontroversy requirement, but also-and perhaps more importantly-to force the other
"
"

branches of the government to perform their tasks, at least initially, independently of the
judiciary.
10S. HOFFMAN, GuLUvER's TROuBLES, OR THE STTING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 263
(1968).
21 It should go without saying that use of other weapons, such as the appropriations
process, is fraught with serious difficulties of its own. See A. FRYE, A RESPONSIBLE CONGRESS:
THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SEcuRrrY 11 (1975).
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Of course, questions concerning the scope of executive and congressional powers over foreign affairs and defense may sometimes
crystallize into "cases" or "controversies" in a more conventional
sense. Given the fact that at present a wide variety of "personal
interests" and "injuries" are considered sufficient to demonstrate a
plaintiffs stake in the outcome, 22 separation of powers questions can
now be litigated even when those most directly affected do not resort
to the courts. 2 3 Important as these changes in the law of standing
are, a proper plaintiff nevertheless will frequently run into the barrier of the so-called "political question" exception to federal court
jurisdiction.
Controversies in the areas of foreign affairs and defense have
traditionally been recognized as prime examples of "political questions." At first glance, the political question doctrine seems to do
no more than categorize certain subjects as nonjusticiable, that is,
not amenable to judicial resolution; yet this characterization has
had consequences far beyond making certain issues noncognizable
in the courts.
While everything Chief Justice Marshall had to say about political questions in the case of Marbury v. Madison4 constituted dicta,
his pronouncements have nevertheless provided the foundations for
a complex doctrine:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise
of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only
to his country in his political character and to his own conscience. . . . The subjects are political. They respect the
nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. . . The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, sub25
mitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
22See Scott, supra note 13, at 660-69..
The most famous example in the "directly affected" category is Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). For an example of a case in which a more remotely
affected plaintiff was held to have standing, see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (challenge to executive efforts to bring about a
reduction in steel imports by means of self-imposed limitations on foreign producers).
21 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2 Id. at 165-70.
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On their face, these observations say little more than the following: if and when the Constitution confers discretion on the executive, the courts will not review the exercise of that discretion. Marshall did not say that questions concerning the existence of discretion are political. Yet over the years the doctrine has taken on a life
of its own, until it has come to mean that certain cases are outside
the judicial sphere, not because their resolution devolves upon the
executive, but because they belong to an area of human affairs, like
defense, too delicate or too difficult to be dealt with by legal rules.
This was clearly the theory underlying the refusal of the Supreme
Court and some lower courts to entertain challenges to the legality
26
of the Indochina war.
Chief Justice Marshall's ambiguous emphasis on questions "in
their nature" political juxtaposed law and politics in a way that
made it plausible to conclude that constraints concerning primarily
"political" matters were, properly speaking, political rather than
legal constraints. Marbury v. Madison is also the case in which
Marshall uttered his famous clich6: "It is emphatically the province
" The closest the Supreme Court came to relying expressly on the political question
doctrine as a barrier to these suits was in a class action challenging the constitutionality of
the Indochina war. A three-judge district court had granted a motion to dismiss on political
question grounds. Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The Supreme Court
summarily affirmed on appeal, with Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart dissenting.
Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Most Supreme Court action concerning the Indochina war took the form of denying petitions for certiorari. In Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S.
934 (1967), Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented with a short opinion
indicating that he believed the Court should face the issue of justiciability and perhaps some
substantive problems as well.
Judge Mulligan of the Second Circuit concisely summarized judicial feelings of inadequacy to deal with "political" issues, suci as the war: "The situation fluctuates daily and
we cannot ascertain at any fixed time either the military or diplomatic status .... While
we as men may well agonize and bewail the horror of this or any war, the sharing of presidential and congressional responsibility, particularly at this juncture, is a bluntly political and
not a judicial question." Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973). Before
this Court of Appeals decision, the plaintiffs had obtained a District Court injunction against
the bombing of Cambodia. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). The
stay of that injunction by the Court of Appeals on July 27, 1973, led to a peculiar involvement
on the part of the Supreme Court. After Mr. Justice Marshall, as the Circuit Justice, had
denied an application to vacate the stay, Mr. Justice Douglas granted the application.
Thereupon, the Solicitor General asked Mr. Justice Marshall to stay the District Court injunction. This stay was granted after consultation with the other Justices by "seriatim telephone calls" (Mr. Justice Douglas' characterization) and with Justice Douglas dissenting. See
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316
(1973). Thus, for a few hours on August 4, 1973, there was in effect a federal court injunction
against the bombing of Cambodia obtained by a member of Congress: the only such instance
of this nature, as far as I know.
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and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."' Thus,
again the unwary observer might assume that no legal constraints
exist where the courts refuse to say what the law is.

It should, of course, be clearly understood that not all cases
involving foreign affairs or defense are political questions in the
technical sense. Instead, as Justice Brennan said recently, "cases in
this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management
by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling
in light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the
possible consequences of judicial action." 8 Also, courts have been
reluctant to apply the doctrine when important individual rights are
at stake.29
At first blush, the political question doctrine is nothing more
than a limitation on court jurisdiction. I am suggesting that it spills
over into nonjudicial debates over legal constraints and has the net
effect of lessening those constraints-in spite of the fact that a
court's refusal to decide a political question does not imply that the
30
acts the court abstains from reviewing are constitutional.
Let me illustrate the point. I recently testified before a congressional committee on presidential emergency powers. I argued that
Congress's failure to provide for the termination of states of
emergency amounted to an unconstitutional abdication of legislative powers. In response, the administration representative posed
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). For a recent commentary criticizing the misuse of
this notion in United States v. Nixon, see Gunther, JudicialHegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 30, 33 (1974).
2 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1962). See also Scharpf, Judicial Review and the
Political Question: A FunctionalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 583 (1966).
21 Scharpf, supra note 28, at 584. For a general survey, see Developments in the
Law-The National SecurityInterest and Civil Liberties,85 HARV. L. REv. 1130 (1972). While
Scharpf is clearly right when he speaks about the courts' reluctance to invoke the political
question doctrine when important individual rights are at stake, this statement must be
qualified in light of the Indochina experience; even though it is difficult to conceive of a more
important individual right than the right to life, the Court refused to adjudicate challenges
to the draft and the war even when they were brought by individuals about to be sent to the
battlefield.
0 Some of those who advocated adjudication of the legality of the Indochina war sacrificed this important point by stressing the link between "political question" and constitutional commitment of a subject matter to another branch of the government: "Decisions that
consider the dangers of the nation speaking with two voices in foreign affairs do not use the
language of abdication but of decision that the scheme of separation of powers validates the
claim that the Executive has the power to decide which he has." Tiger, Judicial Power, the
"PoliticalQuestion Doctrine," and ForeignRelations, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1135, 1170 (1970).
Compare this statement with that of Judge Mulligan, quoted at note 26 supra.
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the following question: "Although as a policy matter, it may well
be that Congress should provide for limits on the duration of emergency, it is hard to find any evidence that the courts consider endless emergencies unconstitutional. In fact, the cases you cite . . .
pretty much hold that the courts will not interfere if Congress goes
on making broad delegations. . . .Can you provide any authority
for your statement that these laws are unconstitutional?" ' 3'
Courts are, of course, reluctant to second-guess Congress or the
executive on the existence of emergency conditions, 32 yet this fact
alone can hardly dispose of the constitutional issue. The question
1,Hearings on the Termination of the National Emergency Before the Special Comm.
of the United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 494 (1973) (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921). Judge Friendly even stated that
courts "will not review a determination so peculiarly within the province of the chief executive" (concerning the continuance in 1966 of the Korean War Emergency unilaterally declared
by President Truman in 1950). Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1966).
An interesting exception to the notion that courts are not fit to judge the existence of emergency conditions was legislated by the Second Congress with respect to certain domestic
emergencies. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264. The Act dealt with federalizing the
militia "to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions," provided that the militia could not be federalized to execute federal laws until the President had
been notified of opposition to those laws by an associate justice or the district judge. Id. § 2.
President Washington relied on this procedure in calling out the militia to suppress the
Whiskey Rebellion. See 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 162 (J. Richardson ed.
1900). It should be noted that judicial notification was restricted to a subject matter perhaps
peculiarl' within the province of the federal judiciary: the breakdown of federal law enforcement in one of the states. This particular rule was repealed in 1795. See Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424. In Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827), Justice Story,
speaking for a unanimous court, found questions concerning the federalization of the militia
during the War of 1812 to be political.
31 Justice Jackson was perhaps the most sensitive on the question of emergency powers.
Concurring in a case upholding a post-World War II rent control act on the basis of the "war
power," he wrote:
We still are technically in a state of war. I would not be willing to hold that war powers
may be indefinitely prolonged merely by keeping legally alive a state of war that had in
fact ended. I cannot accept the argument that war powers last as long as the effects and
consequences of the war, for if so they are permanent-as permanent as the war debts.
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 147 (1948). For a recent adjudication of the emergency
powers issue, see United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975). The case
involved the legality and constitutionality of the import surcharge imposed by President
Nixon in August 1971. The court first upheld broad delegations of power found in the Trading
with the Enemy Act and then, commenting on the role of the courts, said: "Though courts
will not normally review the essentially political questions surrounding the declaration or
continuance of a national emergency, they will not hesitate to review the actions taken in
response thereto or in reliance thereon. It is one thing for courts to review the judgment of a
President that a national emergency exists. It is another for courts to review his acts arising
from that judgment." Id. at 579 (emphasis in original).
For my views on presidential emergency powers, see Hearings, supra note 31, at 75-94,
493-96; CASPER, ON EMERGENCY POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: EVERY INCH A KING? (Occasional
Papers from The Law School, The University of Chicago No. 6, 1973).
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put to me illustrates rather clearly the widespread tendency to view
constitutional law as being restricted to adjudicated principles. The
political question doctrine, which can easily be misunderstood as
drawing the line between law and politics, has added to the difficulties of clearly defining constitutional constraints on foreign and defense policies.3 4
One answer to the question asked of me at the hearing would
be that constitutional rules are authoritative regardless of whether
the courts are able to interpret and enforce them. How then does
one "prove" the unconstitutionality of the unchecked delegation of
emergency powers to the President? Whether or not the judiciary
has the power to pass on the action taken, the duty to interpret the
Constitution in the first instance belongs to the other two branches
of the government, jointly and severally. What has been missing to
a large extent from the congressional rush to delegate ever more
responsibilities to the President in a sense of authority and obligation to determine whether the constitutional allocation of powers is
being stretched to a breaking point. In the performance of this task,
both the legislative and the executive branches must be ready to
reconsider fundamental constitutional policies and basic propositions of political theory. These may be more relevant than the most
recent judicial dicta taken out of context from a few cases. They
may also be less ambiguous than might be supposed.
The American fixation on the courts not only has weakened our
capacity to deal "legally" with political questions within the constitutional framework, but also has emasculated the one constitutional
institution expressly designed as a nonjudicial constitutional constraint on the executive: impeachment. Putting to one side the
difficulties inherent in the drastic nature of impeachment, the complex developments during the Watergate crisis suggest that im31Maybe discourse on the political question doctrine would have been less confused if
less emphasis had been placed on the positive commitment of a subject matter to other
branches and, instead, the negative aspect-non-commitment to the judiciary-had been
stressed. While the constitutional distribution of war powers between the executive and
legislative branches may be doubtful in a given situation, the non-commitment approach
would simply reflect the fact that the task of allocating those powers had not been committed
to the judiciary. The negative formulation makes it somewhat harder simply to dissolve the
constitutional issues in a vast sea of discretion. It goes without saying that I should not like
to be misunderstood as favoring the wholesale abolition of the political question doctrine. For
instance, I agree with the proposition that the legality of the Indochina war was not amenable
to judicial resolution. Various elements of the political question doctrine converged in this
case, leading to the conclusion of nonjusticiability: non-commitment to the judiciary, lack of
manageable standards, embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements and lack of necessary information. On this last point, see Scharpf, supra note 28, at 567.
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peachment has also been weakened as a sanction by the proclivity
to reduce questions about its use to purely legal ones. This ascendancy of law over politics leads to an ultimate irony: after most
constraints have been dissolved into political ones, the remaining
constitutional constraint, impeachment, is blunted by being turned
into a narrowly legal proceeding.
The legal disputes during the Watergate crisis about grounds
for impeachment, access to evidence, procedures of the House
Judiciary Committee and the like were only the beginnings of a legal
thicket that grew denser and thornier the closer the country moved
to an actual impeachment trial. This prominence of legal issues in
connection with impeachment was in part caused by the Framers,
who set the tone when they decided to adapt the English institution
of impeachment trials to their purposes. Thus the Constitution
speaks of "trial" and "conviction" when referring to impeachment
proceedings. To be sure, the Constitutional Convention debates, as
well as subsequent commentary, amply demonstrate that the
Framers distinguished between the "sphere of ordinary jurisprudence" and impeachments. The latter, James Wilson said, "are
founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims;
and are directed to different objects." By this he meant that they
were confined to "political characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishment. ' 3 Yet the very mix of political and adjudicatory elements (the Senate, specially sworn, renders
judgment upon accusation by the representatives of the people for
offenses against the state) indicates that, once again, the Framers
chose a solution that tempered politics with law, while seasoning the
law with politics.
A reading of the Convention debates and other contemporary
sources yields the following purposes associated with impeachment:
i. The threat of impeachment provides security for the good
behavior of the executive and his aides (the "deterrent" function) .36
ii. Impeachment serves to give meaning to the "government
of laws" concept: not even the executive can be secure when he
violates the Constitution and the laws (the "constitutionalist" function) .7
iii. Impeachment is a means for removing an "obnoxious"

3'

2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 166 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 66 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)

(remarks of Gerry).
3' Id. at 65 (remarks of Mason).
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executive and serves as a substitute for violence (the "domestic
tranquility" function) .
iv. Impeachment and removal serve to defend the community
against the executive's betrayal of his trust (the "defensive" function) .38
v. Impeachment and removal serve as punishment for injuries
done to the society itself (the "retributive" function)."
During the impeachment debates of 1974, it quickly became
apparent that members of Congress preferred legal syllogisms borrowed from the criminal law to constitutional judgments in
determining what was meant by "high crimes or misdemeanors." As
a matter of constitutional perspective, this was inappropriate. The
broad purposes of impeachment call for political judgments of the
highest order, since the welfare of the polity and its institutions
must be considered in a complex fashion wholly unrelated to the
normal application of the criminal law.' Yet the great constitutional debate was largely reduced to a discussion of criminal offenses such as obstruction of justice and conspiracy.
The tendency to assign disputes to the discrete realms of "law"
and "politics" has resulted in the deconstitutionalization of issues
concerning the allocation of powers over foreign and defense policy.
It has also had the paradoxical effect of assigning a disproportionate
importance to the few "legal" precedents that do exist. Absent the
continuous consideration and reconsideration of rules and principles, a few oracles have led to the emergence of a constitutional
mythology that does not bear close analysis.
A search of briefs on the constitutional allocation of foreign
affairs powers would probably show that United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp.4" is the single most frequently cited case on the
subject." It retains this significance despite the fact that most of
Justice Sutherland's fancy pronouncements amounted to no more
than dicta, since the problem before the Court was the narrow one
of the constitutionality of a tightly circumscribed delegation of
powers by the Congress to the President over arms shipments to
the Chaco. Similarly, the importance of the decision has not been
Is Id. (remarks of Franklin).
31Id. at 66, 68 (remarks of Madison and Morris).
Id. at 67 (remarks of Randolph).
, Professor Black's views of the subject are generally very close to my own. See his
treatment of impeachable offenses in C. BLACK, IMPEACHmENT: A HANDBOOK 25-52 (1974).
42 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
41For some of the evidence, see Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An HistoricalReassessment, 83 YAL L.J. 1, 3-5 (1973).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[43:463

diminished by the recognition that Justice Sutherland made use of
the occasion to recite as the law his previous writing on the subject."
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Sutherland located the
source of the so-called foreign affairs power of the United States.
Instead of engaging in a close scrutiny of constitutional provisions,
he identified the foreign affairs power with the international law
concept of "external sovereignty." Sutherland sought to domesticate this concept by quoting the reference in the Declaration of
Independence to the "full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other facts and
things which independent states may of right do." He traced this
power back through the Continental Congress to the British Crown
and then placed it, more or less exclusively, in the hands of the
President.
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external
affairs in origin and essential character different from that over
internal affairs, but participation in the exercise of the power
is significantly limited. In this vast external realm, with its
important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a represent45
ative of the nation.
After admitting that the Senate does have the power of advice
and consent with respect to treaties, Sutherland nevertheless
summarized his theory by quoting, out of context, 46 a speech made
by John Marshall in his capacity as a member of the House of
Representatives on March 7, 1800, in which Marshall referred to the
President as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
'47
and its sole representative with foreign nations.
While Justice Sutherland did not reject the notion of constitutional constraints, his most poetic rhetoric was reserved for his discovery "that the presidential powers over foreign affairs derived not
at all from the Constitution, but rather from the Crown of England."4 A short quotation will suffice:
" See G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS (1919); Levitan, The
ForeignRelations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467
(1946); Lofgren, supra note 43, at 11.
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
, See Lofgren, supra note 43, at 24-25.
47 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800). Marshall saw presidential authority as subject to congressional legislation.
11Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 DUKE L.J. 619, 622.
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It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not
alone with an authority vested in the President by an exertion
of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations-apower which does not require as a basis for
its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.4 9
The point I am attempting to make here is not primarily that
Justice Sutherland was wrong-though I believe he was, both as to
the origins of foreign affairs powers and in his concept of an allinclusive executive foreign affairs power-but rather that the relative scarcity of case law in the field has made it easier for judges to
engage in unchecked flights of fancy, which in turn have facilitated
the creation of a constitutional mythology. In that mythology, the
role of Zeus is usually assigned to the President, who rules with the
aid of such abstractions as the executive power, the war power, the
foreign affairs power, or the emergency power. Collecting and summarizing diverse, limited, and sometimes petty constitutional and
statutory authorities into undifferentiated, all-inclusive powers was,
and is, an important technique for dissolving constitutional constraints. 0 Who can claim to know the boundaries and the exact
locus of something like the "war power" or the power of the
President as "mankind's Chief Executive for Peace?" 5'
The effect of this type of thinking is compounded by the great
authority frequently accorded the "gloss" that life has allegedly
written upon executive power to conduct foreign affairs. In an article
written a few years ago on the role of constitutional arguments dur299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (emphasis added).
A parallel use of this technique may be found in the reliance on the spending power
for overcoming constraints imposed by constitutional federalism.
' Bundy, The Presidencyand the Peace, 42 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 353 (1964). Justice Jackson
described the disappearance of constraints most eloquently:
The Government asserts no constitutional basis for this legislation other than this vague,
undefined and undefinable "war power." No one will question that this power is the most
dangerous one to free government in the whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked
in haste and excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional limitation
is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor that makes moderation unpopular.
And, worst of all, it is interpreted by judges under the influence of the same passions
and pressures. Always, as in this case, the Government urges hasty decision to forestall
some emergency or serve some purpose and pleads that paralysis will result if its claims
to power are denied or their confirmation delayed.
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146 (1948) (separate opinion).
"
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ing congressional debates on the Cooper-Church amendment,
Mikva and Lundy criticized the opponents of the amendment for
continually engaging in long recitations of past wars and armed
conflicts in which Congress had not performed the function envisioned by supporters of the amendment. 51 While extremely slippery,
reference to past practice in foreign affairs can claim more than
ordinary plausibility, due to the absence of the customary long line
of judicial precedents. Lawyers like to reason by means of precedents, and nonjudicial precedents seem to be better than no precedents at all. Indeed, the use of precedents is often considered preferable to reasoning from "first principles," that is, from the constitutional text. When the Constitution is applied to foreign affairs, this
attitude leads to a weakening of legal constraints by creating a
widespread belief that uncertainties can and should be resolved by
an uncritical reliance on past political practice.5 3 Moreover, this
"gloss of life" mode of argumentation occasionally includes the further notion that the Constitution is subject to modification by practice. From that view a sociological concept of constitutional law
springs into full bloom.
Here too, most of the trouble begins with Chief Justice Marshall's facile pen. In his exposition of the nature of the Constitution,
he emphasized that it differed from a detailed legal code, that it
was "intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs." We must never
forget, he added, "that it is a constitution we are expounding."54
When one reads Marshall's statements in context, they are duly
qualified and not greatly objectionable. Subsequent generations,
however, have tended to cite the Chief Justice as authority for an
"adaptive" theory of constitutional interpretation that substitutes
usage for constitutional mandates.
Perhaps the most egregious expression of this theory is the famous article by McDougal and Lans, Treaties and CongressionalExecutive or PresidentialAgreements: InterchangeableInstruments
2 Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 449, 492
(1971).
m It should perhaps be noted that the accounts of past practice that are given for this
purpose are often self-serving and the products of shoddy historical scholarship. See, e.g.,
Berger's critique of the famous Rogers Memorandum on executive privilege. R. BERGER,

A CONSTrrUTIONAL MYrH 163-208 (1974). For a critical review of Berger's
book, see Casper, American Geheimniskrdmerei, in 3 REvrmws IN AMERICAN HISTORY 154
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:

(1975).
' McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819).
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of National Policy., Though the textual and historical obstacles
that confront any attempt to negate the treaty provisions of the
Constitution are formidable, the authors did not find them insurmountable: "For even if the widespread use of executive agreements
in dealing with all kinds of problems was not within the conscious
contemplation of the statesmen who foregathered at Philadelphia
. . . , the continuance of the practice by successive administrations
throughout our history makes its contemporary constitutionality
56
unquestionable."
Legal and political advocates of usage find encouragement in
contemporary judicial pronouncements as well. Justice Frankfurter,
for instance, found it unacceptable to confine constitutional law to
the words of the Constitution, disregarding "the gloss which life has
written upon them." While Frankfurter did not believe that even
"deeply embedded traditional ways" could supplant the Constitution, he nevertheless accorded not insignificant authority to usage:
"A systematic, unbroken executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our
government, may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested
''5
in the President by § 1 of Art. H. 1
Again, I am referring to this mode of argumentation primarily
as an element that must be taken into account when constitutional
constraints are considered. The merits of the argument depend upon
the completeness of the view. It would be unsound not to acknowledge the historical fact that the Constitution has been adapted to
changing needs by Supreme Court jurisprudence and governmental
practice. On the other hand, unconstitutional practices cannot become legitimate by the mere lapse of time. There is no way around
the question of whether certain practices are in accord with the
51McDougal & Lans, supra note 11, at 234. For a critique, see R. BERGER, supra note 53,
at 88. One can distinguish the following types of international agreements made by the United
States: (1) treaties; (2) executive agreements made pursuant to treaties; (3) executive agreements made pursuant to legislation; (4) executive agreements made subject to congressional
approval; (5) executive agreements made pursuant solely to the President's own constitutional powers. It is this last category that has proved to be constitutionally most troublesome.
While such agreements may be small in number, they are great in potential political significance. The most complete information on the subject matter can be found in Hearingson S.
3475 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
" McDougal & Lans, supra note 11, at 291.
51Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
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basic scheme and purposes of the Framers. For instance, the circumvention of the Senate's role in treaty making by means of executive agreements may be unconstitutional, in spite of the volume and
frequency of such agreements. 8 Of course, no constitutional argument nor any number of Supreme Court decisions can keep power
in the hands of Congress if Congress "is not wise and timely in
meeting its problems."59
Throughout American history, the "gloss of life" argument,
with its emphasis on usage rather than original understanding, has
received a powerful impetus from the persistence of the view "that
the American political system is singularly unfitted to the effective
pursuit of foreign policy." 6 In this case, Tocqueville may stand as
a representative for many other critics, both past and present.
Tocqueville's doubts about the capacity of the American democracy to conduct foreign affairs wisely stemmed from his opinion
of democracies in general. "A democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in
a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their
consequences with patience."'" Secrecy, attention to detail, continuity, perseverance-all are qualities which, he believed, a democracy
necessarily lacks. In the early years of the Republic, the United
States had been saved from its inherent deficiencies in this area by
the fact that the Constitution and "the favor of the public" had
entrusted the direction of foreign affairs to one individual, Washington, who had been able to establish the basic principle of noninvolvement in European affairs. 2 To overstate Tocqueville's argument only slightly: ultimate judgment as to American capacity in
foreign affairs had to be suspended because, as of the time of his
writing, the foreign policy of the United States consisted of having
no foreign policy at all. 3
For a quantitative breakdown, see Hearings on S. 3475, supra note 55, at 416.
' 343 U.S. 579, 654 (Jackson, J., concurring).

S. HOFFMAN, supra note 20, at 219.
1 A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 243 (Vintage ed. 1954).
,2 Tocqueville's view of the matter was simplistic, to say the least. His account of American attitudes toward revolutionary France was based on the assumption that only the "inflexible" character of Washington prevented the Americans from declaring war against England,
a policy that Tocqueville believed would have been wrong. The underlying model is a polar
one: the lone President against popular passion. It does not take into consideration the fact
that policy toward France and England was determined with both houses of the Congress fully
participating under President Washington, as well as under President Adams. See M. DAUER,
THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 86-91, 168-70 (1953).
13 A. DEToCQUEVILLE, supra note 61, at 242.
"
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Tocqueville's skepticism as to the capacity of a democracy to
conduct an effective foreign policy was based on the deficiencies of
democracies, as opposed to other forms of government, in particular
aristocracies. He arrived at his conclusion from an analysis of ideal
types, not from a review of actual comparative data. Such a study
of the impact of constitutional arrangements on foreign policy then,
as now, would clearly have been an undertaking so complex as to
be almost impossible. 4 In spite of the understandable lack of empirical support, however, Tocqueville's view has become part of the
political mythology that supports the constitutional mythology described earlier, consecrating Presidents and their experts as the
only possessors of the perspective and knowledge needed to define
the national interest in a hostile world. 5 Not only have all recent
Presidents and their "bright young men" been reared to this conviction, but the view has been shared by many influential members
of Congress as well. As recently as 1971, L. Mendel Rivers, then
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said: "Congressmen don't understand these military things. My members
rely on me, and I know who to rely on. I'd rather have one general
6
who knows this business than a hundred senators who don't.1)
II
In the first part of this paper, I have attempted to analyze some
of the difficulties associated with the concept of constitutional constraints within the context of the American political and legal culture, with its heavy emphasis on precedent. Among the most interesting political and legal developments of the last few years has been
an increasing awareness that the judicial model of constitutional
constraints is not an all-purpose model. In response to this new
awareness there has emerged from Congress a type of legislation
that, while not unprecedented," is novel in the context of foreign
affairs. I am referring, in particular, to the War Powers Resolution,"
which attempts to implement the intent of the Framers "and insure
that the collective judgment of both Congress and the President"
will apply to military intervention. In a way, the Resolution substi" S. HOFFMANN, supra note 20, at 219.
'" See Frankel, The Lessons of Vietnam, in THE PENTAGON PAPERS

642 (Quadrangle Books
ed. 1971).
As quoted by A. FRYE, supra note 21, at 5.
" I have in mind the various "lois organiques" passed by the First Congress and some
of the Reconstruction acts.
'" Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-418, 87 Stat. 555.
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tutes legislation for adjudication; as such, I would define it as constitutional "framework" legislation6 9 which interprets the Constitution by providing a legal framework for the governmental decisionmaking process. Examples in addition to the War Powers Resolution
are the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974 o and bills now pending concerning governmental emergency
powers, 7 1 executive agreements, so-called covert action and other
matters.
Framework legislation is different from ordinary legislation in
that it does not formulate specific policies for the resolution of specific problems, but rather attempts to implement constitutional
policies. Both declaratory and regulatory in nature, it describes the
constitutional distribution of powers and regulates the decision
making of the President and the Congress. Framework legislation
thus forces both Congress and the President to focus on constitutional considerations, which are ordinarily submerged in disputes
concerning specific policies. By providing institutionalized forms for
consultation and the resolution of disagreements, it also gives
greater specificity to the notion of legal constraints and attempts to
stabilize to a greater extent expectations about the ways in which
governmental power is exercised. Finally, by providing procedures
for the evaluation and control of exercises of presidential power, it
strives for constitutional legitimacy.
There are a few concepts in political theory that are best treated
in a relatively simple-minded way. The events of the last fifteen
years should have taught us that "legitimacy" is one such concept.
If democracy requires that the individual accept the majority decision after a vote has been taken,"2 democracy also requires that the
voting process be in accord with the necessary legitimating procedures, that is, those set forth in the Constitution. The "legitimacy"
of the Indochina war was so easily questioned precisely because
nonconstitutional notions of legitimacy were substituted for the
constitutional procedures. But little legitimacy can be conferred by
the nationwide popular mandate that Presidents claim to hold in
11Professor Gunther speaks of "an unusual, quasi-constitutional variety of congressional
action, delineating not substantive policy but processes and relationships." G. GUNTHER,
supra note 2, at 429.
"oAct of July 12, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297. On the problems that gave rise
to the legislation, see L.

FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER (1975).
7, The bill relating to national emergencies (H.R. 3884) passed the House on September

4, 1975. For a status report, see 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY 1958 (1975).
72

See H.

PITKIN, WiTrF~sTEN AND JUSTICE

283 (1972).
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their sole possession; 3 the same can be said of attempts to legitimate executive action by reference to the temporary support of a
majority in a public opinion poll, the allocation of funds through the
appropriations process, or a favorable report by an "expert" administrative elite. While it may be empirically accurate to view the
governmental decision-making process as "plebiscitarian" in nature
or as a reflection of the desires of special interest groups or elites,
such facts are dangerous guides, for they ignore the constitutional
standards of representative government to which, in the United
States, the notion of legitimacy refers.7 4 Many of the modern admirers of McCulloch v. Maryland and adaptation by usage tend to
ignore the qualifiers of Marshall's position: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and
'75
spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.
The present generation, like preceding generations, seems to be
re-evaluating its concept of constitutional law and what it considers
to be the "spirit" of the fundamental constitutional arrangements.
In so doing, it reacts to what it considers to be miscarriages. I am
thinking particularly of the "imperial presidency." The exaggeration of presidential claims to constitutional authority has revealed
that the colossus may have feet of clay after all. The long-accepted
assumption that Presidents and their experts alone possess the
perspective and knowledge needed to define the national interest in
a hostile world seems to have been discredited to a considerable
extent by the Indochina war and Watergate. We are beginning to
understand the danger that lurks beneath the facade of "mankind's
Chief Executive for Peace." I suppose historians call enterprises of
this nature "revisionist." The fresh look we are taking is limited by
our own experience, to be sure. Yet we should be able to avoid
myopia.
In this connection, the War Powers Resolution may be less
significant for what it accomplishes than for what it endeavors.
Section 2(c), for instance, provides:
As to foreign policy, the claim may frequently be refuted. Cf. Kurland, supra note 48,
at 622.
71On the concept of legitimacy, see PrrKIN, supra note 72, at 280-86. For a concise
statement of the form of political rule in the United States that emerged from World War II
and its consequences, see Wolin, The New Conservatives, The N. Y. Review of Books, Feb.
5, 1976, at 6. See especially id. at 10, cols. 3 & 4.
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).
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The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-inChief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
For reasons that I shall detail shortly, there can be little doubt that
this is a fairly precise summary of the Framers' intent. Critics of the
resolution, such as Dean Rostow, in addition to arguing its impracticability, contend that it impermissibly limits the vague collection
of presidential powers "inherent in his role as the nation's chief
diplomat, commander-in-chief, and head of state."7 6 The critics ignore the fact that the Resolution is mostly a reaffirmation of
principle, quite ambiguous as to its scope and binding effect.7" Thus
there is some doubt as to whether section 2 was meant to be an
operative part of the statute, 78 what its peculiarly Germanic use of
the passive present tense instead of the imperative entails ("are
exercised" instead of "shall be exercised"), and, finally, what significance is to be attributed to section 8(d)(1) which states that nothing in the joint resolution "is intended to alter the constitutional
authority of the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of
existing treaties."
If the Resolution is to be faulted for transgressing constitutional
limitations, it must be because of the termination provisions of
sections 5(b) and (c). Section 5(c) calls for the termination of presidential action if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution.
This mechanism is sometimes viewed as violating the executive veto
provisions in the Constitution79 since a concurrent resolution is not
subject to veto. While this argument might be persuasive in other
contexts, accepting it here would mean that the President could,
71Rostow, supra note 11, at 803. Rostow's views are set forth in more detail in Rostow,
Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEXAS L. REV. 833 (1972).
17See COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN
POLICY, REPORT 197-98 (1975).
" See H.R. REP. No. 547, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1973). See also T. EAGLETON, WAR
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER

201-05 (1974);

ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVO-

13
(1975).
11 S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 122-23
(1975). As to concurrent resolutions in a nonstatutory context, and the War Powers Resolution
in particular, see the careful analysis in Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional
Control of the Executive, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 983, 1084-86 (1975).
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supported only by one-third plus one of the membership of either
house, commit the nation to war for as long as available appropriations lasted. It seems to me that such a result stands the congressional power to declare war on its head.
More problematic, by far, is section 5(b), which forces the
President to terminate the use of armed forces after sixty or ninety
days unless the Congress affirmatively authorizes the action. It is
highly doubtful whether Congress may constitutionally indulge its
own inclination toward indecision by attaching legal consequences
to its passivity vis-A-vis executive judgments on questions of war
and peace.8 0 I agree that the Constitution mandates "collective
judgment of both the Congress and the President,"8 ' but judgment
means exactly that: judgment .82To the extent that the War Powers
Resolution is an attempt to put the congressional house in order as
well as an effort to control the executive, this provision falls short
of the goal. The history of the Indochina war is not just a lesson in
the "imperial presidency," it also provides textbook illustrations of
congressional irresponsibility.
Since, as stated above, I consider defense issues to be political
questions in the jurisdictional sense, the question of the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution is unresolvable in the sense
that only the "court of history" 4 will ultimately determine the merits. That does not mean, however, that the constitutional issues
involved should be ignored; for if they were, we would run the risk
"of leaving large areas of our system of constitutional limitations
neglected or through inattention made the butt of partisan con85
test."
It is a widespread belief that the Framers did not consider
foreign policy as the first priority when establishing their network
of institutions.8 The opposite is more likely correct. The federal
government set up by the Framers was essentially created for the
8
effective and controlled conduct of foreign and defense policy; '
80To

this extent I agree with President Nixon's veto message. 119 CONG. REC. 34,990

(1973).
Act of Nov. 7, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555, § 2(a).
I disagree with Frye, supra note 21, at 214, who apparently views the requirement of
termination following sixty (or ninety) days of congressional inaction as the equivalent of
rendering judgment.
See note 34 supra.
For a judicial reference to the "court of history" (which found the Sedition Act unconstitutional), see New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
15 D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 11 (1966).
"

S.

"

See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison): "The powers

HOFFMANN,

supra note 20, at 220.
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"domestic" improvements were not considered to be within the
domain of the federal government. Indeed, foreign affairs were- the
predominant concern of the new government during the first three
decades of the Constitution. 8
A commentator making this historical assertion is likely to encounter a response juxtaposing the simple world of the early republic with the "complexities of the modern world." Clearly, this argument proves too much, condemning the entire Constitution to irrelevancy. But one may also doubt its accuracy. As I have written
elsewhere, "[A]t the time of the Constitutional Convention, Europe presented America with incredibly intricate foreign policy
problems. The Europe of that period was a tangled skein of shifting
alliances, dynastic ambitions, incipient revolution, and trade rivalries. In dealing with these problems under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers undoubtedly came to appreciate the complexity
of foreign affairs in a troubled world." 8
These background facts should be kept in mind as one looks at
the Constitution's distribution of powers in the areas of foreign and
defense policy. The following list is offered, not to reduce the complexities of the governmental process to an enumeration of "mays"
and "must nots," but rather because it is useful occasionally to
derive a few simple points from fairly indisputable facts, that is,
from the actual constitutional arrangements themselves, instead of
from involved analyses of the convention debates.
A. Powers concerning foreign relations.
1. Presidential powers
a. Power to make treaties (Senate consent required).
b. Power to appoint envoys (Senate consent required).
c. Power to receive envoys.
d. The executive power (?).
delegated by the proposed Constitution are few and defined . . . [and] will be exercised
principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce."
"J. YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 1800-1828, at 160 (1966).
9, Casper, Response, in Symposium-Organizing the Government to Conduct Foreign
Policy: The Constitutional Questions, 61 VA. L. REv. 747, 777 (1975). For a chronicle of the
American diplomatic efforts from the Declaration of Independence to the ratification of the
Constitution, see S. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 15-84 (1936).
,1 The list is reasonably complete, although a few petty powers have been omitted. The
list is restricted to powers actually mentioned in the Constitution, except that on two specified occasions, I have added clearly implied powers.
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2.
a.
b.

Senate powers
Power to advise on and consent to treaties.
Power to advise on and consent to appointment of
envoys.

3. Congressional powers
a. Power to regulate foreign commerce.
b. Power to lay duties.
c. Power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law
of nations.
B.

Powers concerning defense.
1. Presidential powers
a. Power of Commander-in-Chief.
b. Power to repel sudden attacks on the United States
or its armed forces (not mentioned in the constitutional text but indisputably granted).
2. Congressional powers
a.
b.
c.

Power to raise and support armies.
Power to provide and maintain a navy.
Power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.
d. Power to provide for calling forth the militia to repel
invasions.
e.
Power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
require it.
f.
Power to declare war.
C. General powers relevant to the conduct of foreign and defense
policies.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Presidential powers
"Power" (duty) to inform the Congress about the
state of the union and make recommendations.
Power to convene both Houses of Congress or either
of them on extraordinary occasions.
Veto power.
"Power" (duty) to execute the laws (this includes
unmentioned, delegated rulemaking powers).
Power of appointments (Senate consent generally
required).
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Senate Powers
Power to advise on and consent to appointments.
Congressional powers
Power to lay taxes, etc., and provide for the common
defense and general welfare.
Power of appropriations.
Power to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution congressional powers, and all
other powers vested in the government, or in any department or officer thereof.
Impeachment.

A list of this nature establishes three points rather graphically.
First, given the fact that the Constitution works with detailed and
specific authorities, one should be extremely wary of "sweeping in"
and locating in one branch powers derived from such abstractions
as the war power or the foreign affairs power. The dispute over
whether the particular wording of the vesting clause in article II was
designed to add powers not specifically enumerated is textually unresolvable. Article II vests the executive power instead of, by analogy to article I, "all executive powers herein granted." The dispute
cannot be resolved by an analysis of the convention debates either."
My own opinion is that the Constitution makes most sense if enumerations are read as being exhaustive. On the other hand, if a
power not mentioned can be conceived of as indisputably "executive," it was probably not meant to be withheld. In any event, the
controversial subjects, such as the legitimacy and scope of executive
agreements, are not disposed of by this qualification. Second, much
of the search of convention debates and other contemporary sources
for characterizations of the Framers' intent in polar terms like "congressional preeminence" or "strong executive" is rather beside the
point. Third, "separation of powers" is not the most meaningful way
to summarize the constitutional arrangements.
One cannot quarrel with the notion that the creation of a oneperson national executive with veto power, power to make treaties
and the like was intended to remedy the inefficiencies of the Continental Congress system of administrative committees. 2 The famous
statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis that the doctrine of separation
of powers was adopted not to promote efficiency, but to preclude the
" See C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789, at 117 (1969).
,2Id. at 74. See also L. FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 18 (1972).
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exercise of arbitrary power,93 does not adequately account for all the
aspects of the constitutional arrangement. A serious review of the
distribution scheme just outlined indicates that the Framers sought
to achieve both purposes.
For instance, the Framers clearly wanted to ensure the effective
pursuit of war if the occasion arose, which accounts for making the
President Commander-in-Chief, an "executive" function. On the
other hand, the decision as to whether or not the nation should go
to war was entrusted to Congress, except that if there were an emergency (sudden attack), the President was given authority to act.
That latter authority, in turn, was diminished because the Congress
retained the power to refuse to back the sword with the purse. 4 Yet
even in the exercise of this power the Framers limited Congress by
restricting appropriations to a two-year term. Checks were heaped
upon checks so that the love of power of those occupying the various
branches of government could be harnessed, while the deficiencies
of the Confederation were avoided. 5
In view of these facts, which emerge from the text of the Constitution itself, the Framers' own characterization of the system as one
of separation of powers seems much less satisfactory than the
"checks and balances" formula. While this formula has become
widely accepted as describing the specific arrangements of the
United States Constitution, separation of powers has remained an
ambiguous concept, open to the most diverse interpretations. 7 Indeed, the only question one can ask about separation of powers that
yields some positive result is: what does it mean not to have separation of powers? The response of Montesquieu and the Framers to
,3 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See Young's account of the War of 1812. J. YOUNG, supra note 88, at 184.
" See Sharp, The ClassicalAmerican Doctrineof "The Separationof Powers," 2 U. Cm.
L. REv. 385, 416 (1935).
" At the time of the Revolution, just as during the English Civil War (and, later,
the French Revolution), the pure doctrine of separation of powers came to dominate
American constitutional thought. Later, as in the English Restoration era, the notion of
balance (specifically, the concept of checks and balances) reasserted itself to temper the
radical implications of the pure doctrine.
Katz, The Origins of American Constitutional Thought, in 3 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 474, 488 (1969).
,7 [S]eparation of powers theorists-and even the same theorists at different
times-have not been agreed about the institutional arrangements which satisfy the
requirement of that doctrine, a fact to be recognized in judging whether, even if valid in
some general sense, the separation of powers doctrine is specific enough to be a useful
constitutional standard.
W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 128 (1967). See generally id.; M. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1967); Sharp, supra note 95.
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this question is well known: there can be no liberty if legislative,
executive and judicial powers are united." In this sense, separation
of powers is a functional concept: separation is a necessary, if not a
sufficient condition of liberty. Beyond this point, however, little else
can be said with conviction, since the different powers do not signify
clearly differentiated functions and the actual arrangements show
the powers closely intertwined. 9
Superficially, the legislative and the executive branches seem
to possess fairly identifiable functions: lawmaking and lawexecuting. The third branch, through dispute-settling, performs one
part of the executive function under special conditions and by
means of special procedures. In reality, however, both the executive
and the judiciary engage in lawmaking through interpretation and
rulemaking. The power to review enables the judiciary to negate
the legislative function. The executive can do the same with the
help of the veto power. The legislative branch, on the other hand,
partakes of many executive functions through legislative oversight,
appropriations decisions and the like. In short, under the system of
checks and balances, each branch exercises powers clearly subsumed within a function attributed to another branch.100
We might well be better off to forgo invocation of the catchphrase "separation of powers"-especially since it has other connotations in other countries that tend to get mixed up with American
usage. For instance, the concept may be employed, as it was in
France, Italy and other European countries during the first half of
the nineteenth century, to protect public administration against
judicial meddling. Thus the famous French law of 16-24 August 1790
provides: "Judicial functions are distinct and will always remain
separate from administrative functions. Judges may not, under pain
of forfeiture of their offices, concern themselves in any manner
whatsoever with the operation of the administration, nor shall they
summon administrators to appear before them on account of their
official functions." 10 ' The opening sentence of the provision clearly
indicates that the separation of powers concept was used to justify
the prohibition. American Presidents like to use the concept in this
"French" way, though they tend to extend its meaning to cover
congressional interference with the executive as well.' 2 In practice,

"

G. WOOD,THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 152 (1969).
Sharp, supra note 95, at 436 & passim, speaks of "blending."

"0e

Cf.

L.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89

(1972).

1011 J. DUVERGIER, COLLZcTION COMPLETE DES Lois, DECRETS, ETC. 361, 363 (1824).
202 See, for instance, the brief on behalf of President Nixon in the case of Nixon v. Sirica,
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however, most arguments derived from "separation of powers" tend
to be resolved by a balancing of interests, which is more profitably
carried on under the rubric of checks and balances. This principle
applies even to a claim as deeply rooted in separation of powers
connotations as executive privilege.
0 3 the Supreme
In its decision in United States v. Nixon,"
Court
accorded recognition to executive privilege when needed to protect
military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets. It also
recognized a "presumptive privilege" for confidential presidential
communications. While the case dealt with executive privilege as an
evidentiary privilege rather than with congressional-executive relations, the broad language of the Court appears to give it more general implications.
The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution. . . Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there
any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the
extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's powers, it is constitutionally based. 04
The Supreme Court decided the specific issue before it by taking a balancing approach, since the doctrine of separation of powers
"without more" could not sustain an absolute presidential privilege. 0 5 It seems to me that an analogous approach has to be taken
in the area of congressional-executive relations. Some legal constraints should be created by means of what I have called framework
legislation so that the mere fact that the courts have had no occasion
or jurisdiction to adjudicate congressional-executive conflicts does
not create a situation where the only constraints that exist are
purely political ones. The lack of such a legal framework tends to
create unnecessary tensions between the executive and the legislative branches and encourages the use of political sanctions (like the
withholding of appropriations) that may have undesirable consequences unrelated to the dispute. Congressional authority to enact
such legislation flows from the specific power of Congress to make
487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). It was argued that executive privilege, derived from the
doctrine of separation of powers, "protects" the executive branch from the other two
branches. The administration generously argued that "all" branches benefit from the independence thus secured to them by the constitutional separation of powers. N.Y. Times, Aug.
8,1973, at 18, cols. 1-3.
"3 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
"3 Id. at 708, 711.
"' Id.
at 706.
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all laws necessary and proper for executing all powers vested in the
government or in any department or officer of the government,' 5 as
well as from the constitutionally-based need of Congress for information in the areas where it has legislative and other duties.
In drafting such legislation Congress will have to balance the
interests at stake: its own needs for information and the President's interest in the confidentiality of his communications. ,o7 There
are no hard and fast rules. For instance, some argue that the case
for executive privilege is strongest as to the President and his "immediate advisers" and weakest as one reaches the outskirts of the
bureaucracy. 01 This way of looking at the question is singularly
unhelpful. The issue is not proximity to the President, but the need
of the United States government (in the broad sense of the word,
not restricted to the executive) for confidentiality. Any congressional balancing eventually may come up against a core of executive
privilege which, in view of United States v. Nixon, Congress cannot
constitutionally impair. However, it is impossible to determine in
the abstract where this "core zone" begins, since the determination
depends in part on the manner in which both Congress and the
executive safeguard the confidentiality of information. 9
Let me attempt to "apply" the constitutional framework as I
see it to an important issue. Professor Henkin has stressed the
President's authority to declare policy and make informal commitments, undertakings and understandings, and reflect general attitudes in the daily conduct of foreign relations. 10 He has also argued
that Congress is "probably" constitutionally obliged to implement
what the President is constitutionally entitled to formulate., If
this means that Congress has the obligation to provide money for
105

U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.

' Lowi stressed the need for Congress and the executive branch "to find means of
dealing with each other frankly, yet confidentially" in order to avoid the dangers of oversell
that accompany presidential attempts to rely mainly on popular support:
The involvement in Vietnam was sold by American image-makers as a case of unambiguous aggression and therefore of the need for military victory. Perhaps it was both of
these things, but to sell it on the front pages that way in order to insure support at home,
left world diplomats, including our own, with almost no options. Under increasing popular pressure, magnified by congressmen who might rightly feel that they have not been
properly informed, the extremes of oversell are exceeded over and over again."
T. Low,, THE END OF LIBERALISM 179 (1969).
,og See R. BERGER, supra note 53, at 264.
209 On this subject, see id. at 288-94.
,,0 Henkin, "A More Effective System" for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional
Framework, in Symposium-Organizing the Government to Conduct Foreign Policy: The
Constitutional Questions, 61 VA. L. REV. 747, 755 (1975).
" Id. at 758.
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embassies in countries the President has recognized, I will not
quarrel with the assertion. On the other hand, if it implies that
Congress, as a matter of constitutional-as distinguished irom
international-law, is bound to deliver on the President's undertakings, I disagree. Given congressional powers over defense, commerce, the purse and legislation, the President has little authority
unilaterally to make any binding commitments on behalf of the nation. The President clearly may make "informal" commitments,
but an argument that the authority spills over into the domestic
power distribution is one of the "slippery slope" variety. While
Professor Henkin would certainly be unwilling to slide down the
slope for very long, recent events demonstrate what such a confusion between international and domestic authority may lead to. I
should like to discuss one example: the 1973 bombings of Cambodia.
On April 30, 1973, Secretary of State Rogers submitted a memorandum to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he
set forth the basis of presidential authority to continue bombing
Cambodia." 2 The memorandum started out by suggesting that
authority to bomb Cambodia was linked to article 20 of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, signed
in Paris on January 27, 1973, an agreement not ratified by the Senate. Article 20 required the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from
Laos and Cambodia and obligated the parties to refrain from using
the territory of these countries to encroach on the sovereignty and
security of other countries. The administration argued that North
Vietnam was then violating article 20. It failed to recognize, however, that whatever authority the United States may have possessed
under international law to retaliate against North Vietnam for its
breach of the agreement could not supply the President with constitutional authority so to act. To argue otherwise leads to the conclusion that the President may, in disregard of constitutional processes, engage the country in war whenever he finds that an executive agreement has been violated.
Since the United States had undertaken no congressionally authorized commitment to come to the defense of the Cambodian
government, the President could invoke no treaty, legislation or
resolution to that effect. The memorandum seemed to admit this
much by stating that the American bombing did not "represent a
commitment by the United States to the defense of Cambodia" but
rather was "a meaningful interim action to bring about compliance
112

For the text, see N.Y. Times, May 1, 1973, at 10, cols. 3-8.
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with this critical provision in the Vietnam agreement." It seems to
be a fair summary of the memorandum to say that it sought to
justify the bombing of Cambodia as a continuation of the Vietnam
war. Since American forces had been withdrawn from Vietnam and
since all prisoners of war had been returned, the only one of the
three purposes for military action listed by President Nixon on May
8, 1972 that was still being pursued was "prevention of the forceful
imposition of a Communist government in South Vietnam." While
it is doubtful that Congress had ever authorized such a war goal, it
clearly had not authorized its accomplishment by waging an air war
in a third country. The President's authority to conduct day-to-day
military operations in a congressionally authorized war is beyond
question; but without fresh authority from the Congress, I doubt
that he could continue military activities, such as the prolonged
bombing of a third country, after the war had ended on the theory
that it was necessary to preserve the gains won in the peace agreement.
The memorandum correctly stated that under the Constitution
the war powers are shared between the executive and legislative
branches of government. The memorandum erred, however, when
it threatened the Congress with the specter of a zero-sum game by
saying that this allocation of powers had misled some to argue that
"the Constitution required immediate cessation of the air strikes in
Cambodia because of the Paris agreement," "an automatic selfdestruct mechanism designed to destroy what has been so painfully
achieved." The Constitution, of course, required no such thing. The
proper sharing of the war powers, or what the memorandum termed
"cooperation between the Congress and the President," simply
called for the President to go back to Congress for authority to bomb
Cambodia in order to prevent a Communist takeover in Vietnam.
Then Congress would have been compelled to decide whether international law, national commitments and the national interest made
such a policy feasible and desirable. As we know, Congress ultimately decided this question in the negative.'
"I This occurred in a "compromise" bill following a successful presidential veto of an
earlier "cut-off" of funds for the bombing. The compromise postponed the termination by
several weeks to August 15, 1973, Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-49, 87 Stat. 99.
The memorandum also relied on the kind of misreading of the political question doctrine
I discussed earlier, quoting Judge Wyzanski's discussion of President Nixon's duty to bring
the war to an end "with a profound concern for the durable interests of the nation-its
defense, its honor, its morality," in Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In fact,
the court had expressly rejected the theory, put forward in the Rogers memorandum, that
appropriation acts or extensions of the draft constituted approval of the war in Vietnam.
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The system of checks and balances requires coordination in the
development of foreign and defense policies. In spite of the recent
past, it seems fair to say that most of the questions that arise are
not primarily questions of authority or institutional capacities. Secretary Kissinger, though, has recently expressed his concern over
what he perceives as a growing tendency of the Congress to legislate
in detail the day-to-day or week-to-week conduct of foreign affairs.
It should be recognized, he said, that the legislative process
-deliberation, debate and statutory law-is not well-suited to
the detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy.
Making a Tocqueville-style argument, he added: "Legal prescriptions, by their very nature, lose sight of the sense of nuance and the
feeling for the interrelationship of 11
issues
on which foreign policy
4
success or failure so often depends.
While there can be no doubt that legislation may limit the
options available to the executive branch and generally create rigidities, and while there can also be no doubt that Congress is under
an obligation to provide itself with the capacity to respond more
quickly and in a more ad hoc fashion when necessary, the particular
congressional interventions the Secretary cited hardly prove his
case. The conditions Congress attached to trade with the Soviet
Union,"15 the exclusion of the OPEC countries of Venezuela and
Ecuador from benefits conferred by trade-reform legislation,"" or
the dispute over arms aid to Turkey'"7 can scarcely be explained in
terms of an institutional incapacity to recognize "the interrelationship of issues." A more proper explanation would appear to be
the failure of the administration to convince the Congress that the
executive cost-benefit analysis was more accurate than the congressional one. As the Secretary realized, congressional power over trade
or aid was not in question. The issue was simply the wisdom of a
particular policy-pursued, admittedly, in a world-wide context. To
"This Court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to appropriate money or to extend the draft, a Congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers to that war."
Id. at 615. Yet even this passage is irrelevant, pro or con, since it was mere dictum. The court
ultimately refused to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the constitutionality of the
President's measures to end the war was a political question beyond the judicial power
conferred by article I1.
' N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1975, at 6, col. 4.
"'
Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 402, 88 Stat. 2056.
' Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 502(b)(2), 88 Stat. 2067.
17 Act of Oct. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-104, § 2(c), 89 Stat. 509 (allowing limited presidential suspension of embargo); Act of Dec. 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 22, 88 Stat. 1813
(imposing embargo).
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be sure, Congress is bound to make mistakes, and, for all we know,
the three acts may all have been grave errors, but making mistakes
is hardly an exclusively congressional prerogative.
The proper way to conceptualize the interdependence of Congress and the executive is by thinking in terms of coordination,
rather than cooperation or partnership. Though partnership is obviously desirable, the idea of coordination expresses more precisely
the constitutional demands of the system of checks and balances.
While coordination is perhaps inefficient in the narrow sense of
making hard and fast international commitments by Presidents
very difficult, it is the constitutional scheme. It is also efficient in
the broader sense that freely-given congressional consent is probably more durable and reliable in the long run than consent coerced
by presidential faits accomplis.
CONCLUSION

The primary mode of enforcing the constitutional system of
checks and balances must be legislation. Only if Congress is willing
to restrain, will we have anything approaching effective legal constraints. My concern has been with the conduct of foreign and defense policy. When we turn to national security and individual
rights, perhaps more reliance can be placed on the courts, though
their performance is bound to remain uneven, with as many hits as
misses in determining the balance between national security interests and individual rights."' And, even where threats to individual
liberties are concerned, the only effective safeguards are often legislative ones: if nobody, overseers or victims, knows what the CIA,
FBI, Secret Service, or Internal Revenue Service are up to, a legal
challenge may be practically impossible. It is also important that
the delicate balancing required when individual rights are restricted
is carried out in times of calm. In periods of passion, moderation is
frequently not to be had from administrators, legislators, or judges.
Thus, for example, the wild growth of clandestine activities that has
surfaced in recent years must be carefully reviewed for constitutionality.

1 9

,, See Developments in the Law, supra note 29.
" I am referring here to so-called "covert activities." The public record suggests that
such activities undertaken on behalf of the United States and other countries range from
"mere" propaganda efforts to the use of violent means, including the employment of warlike
force (as in the Bay of Pigs invasion). Most covert activities may be conceptualized as
interventions from within: a foreign country makes use of methods that the target government
would probably label as ranging from the seditious to the rebellious if they were employed
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One objection to the concept of coordination is likely to be that
it will further exacerbate the tendency already present without the
existence of legislative restraints: formulation of policies in a political vacuum. 121 If this habit is an element of the "national style," it
may indeed be reinforced, though I have my doubts. But even asby domestic opposition groups acting in isolation. An examination of the 1947 National
Security Act, 50 U.S.C. § 402, suggests that the legislation is exclusively concerned with
better formulation and coordinationof national security policy. It does not address the propriety of covert activities. The Central Intelligence Act likewise focuses on the coordination
of intelligence activities and charges the Central Intelligence Agency with performing "such
other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national seburity as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) (emphasis
added). The public record does not justify the assumption that at the time of its enactment
in 1947, the term "intelligence" was used by the Congress to include covert activities. While
neither section 402 nor section 403 can be viewed as legal authority for covert activities, it is
also clear that they do not attempt to restrict such activities if they were authorized, for
instance, by inherent presidential powers. There is a problem, though, concerning the use of
the Central Intelligence Agency for the execution of presidential policies, since the Agency is
congressionally established. One might therefore argue that the President may not employ it
for purposes not specifically mentioned in the Central Intelligence Act, though such purposes
may be otherwise legitimate. As a matter of first impression, it seems that the Central
Intelligence Agency differs from the "independent agencies" in that it is thoroughly attached
to the executive branch by means of the National Security Council "direction" under which
it operates. Therefore, it would appear that the President is not clearly barred from making
use of the Central Intelligence Agency for the execution of national security policies that he
is constitutionally empowered to pursue. The matter is, however, not free from doubt and
perhaps deserves further clarification.
The heart of the issue is the question of "inherent" presidential power to engage in covert
activities. An abstract answer is not easy to give, in view of the fact that even a narrow
definition of covert activities covers "mere" propaganda. To the extent that covert activities
are related to major foreign policy decisions (like participation in the overthrow of a foreign
government) with far-reaching consequences for the foreign policy, national security, and
international position of the United States, it must be kept in mind that the constitutional
scheme for the conduct of foreign and defense policy is one of shared responsibilities and
checks and balances. All inquiry should start from the premise that unauthorized and unreported covert activities are not in accord with the spirit and the letter of the Constitution.
This is not to say that one cannot conceive of rare emergency-type situations where the
President would have to take responsibility for independent action. One could argue that in
1974 Congress authorized future covert activities in section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1974. Act of Dec. 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795. While section 662 refers
only to "intelligence activities," the context in which it was enacted suggests that the
language referring to "activities other than those intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence" is a euphemism for covert activities. If this is so, then covert activities are now
(for the first time) expressly authorized, provided that two statutory conditions are met: (1)
there is a presidential finding of importance to the national security and (2) the President
reports in a "timely" manner to the appropriate congressional committees. Conclusion:
"Although Congress attempts much, it accomplishes comparatively little."
For the analysis and proposals of the Church Committee on Intelligence Activities concerning covert activities, see SEN. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, S. REP. No. 755,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-61 (1976).
1' See S. HOFFMANN, supra note 20, at 152-53.
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suming that such reinforcement would occur, it may be a necessary
evil. United States foreign policy has suffered gravely from a disregard not only for the outside real world, but for the domestic real
world as well. Coordination should have the beneficial effect of filling some of the domestic vacuum. One of the greatest defects in
foreign and defense policy in recent years has been that it was formulated and carried out without having been legitimated. But legitimacy is not to be had unless constitutional constraints, both procedural and substantive (Bill of Rights), are taken seriously. The wellbeing of the United States in the system of international relations
and its domestic well-being can no more be separated than governmental powers can be clearly differentiated into foreign and domestic ones, or the Government can be divided into branches of natural
leaders and natural followers.

